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The Robinson-Goforth topology of swaps in adjoining payoffs elegantly arranges 2x2 ordinal games in accordance 
with important properties including symmetry, number of dominant strategies and Nash Equilibria, and alignment 
of interests. Adding payoff families based on Nash Equilibria illustrates an additional aspect of this order and aids 
visualization of the topology. Making ties through half-swaps not only creates simpler games within the topology, 
but, in reverse, breaking ties shows the evolution of preferences, yielding a natural ordering for the topology of 2x2 
games with ties. An ordinal game not only represents an equivalence class of games with real values, but also a 
discrete equivalent of the normalized version of those games. The topology provides coordinates which could be 
used to identify related games in a semantic web ontology and facilitate comparative analysis of agent-based simu-
lations and other research in game theory, as well as charting relationships and potential moves between games as 
a tool for institutional analysis and design.  
 
   The topology of 2x2 games (Robinson and Goforth 
2005) offers an elegant tool for understanding relation-
ships among ordinal games and their transformations. 
Game theory research has concentrated on Prisoner’s 
Dilemma and a few other symmetric games, although 
most of the possible games are asymmetric, and most 
possible ordinal games have ties. The topology helps 
show both the uniqueness of Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
Chicken, and the games closely related to them, and 
how they fit into the much larger and more diverse 
landscape of games, many of which are assurance (Stag 
Hunt/coordination) games or have a harmonious coop-
erative (win-win) outcome, and even more of which 
have asymmetric outcomes. This paper briefly intro-
duces the topology of 2x2 games and outlines how 
payoff families, normalization of payoff values, and 
natural ordering of preference structures aid under-
standing relationships among games in the topology.  
   The topology organizes games by closeness in terms 
of swaps in adjoining payoffs, revealing patterns in 
symmetry, number of dominant strategies and Nash 
Equilibria, and alignment of interests. Adding payoff 
families based on Nash Equilibria reveals another as-
pect of order in the topology (Bruns 2010a). Robinson 
and Goforth plot payoffs on order graphs to efficiently 
display symmetries and mixes of interests (Schelling 
1960; Greenberg 1990; Robinson and Goforth 2005) as 
shown in their “periodic table” of 2x2 ordinal games.
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A numeric display in normal form with additional visu-
alization provides a more accessible version of the 
topology, which may make the topology easier to learn 
and use, including for analysis of potential moves be-
tween games (Bruns 2010c).  Making ties between ad-
joining payoffs extends the topology to non-strict 
games (Robinson, Goforth, and Cargill 2007) and can 
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be arranged according to the distinct classes of prefer-
ence structures for ties identified by Fraser and Kilgour 
(1986). The reverse process of breaking ties to create 
different payoffs indicates a natural ordering for the 
topology, and establishes a grid of coordinates useful 
for identifying related games, including normalized 
versions of games with real payoffs (Bruns 2010b). 
   Swaps. In the Robinson-
Goforth topology of the pay-
off space of 2x2 games, swaps 
in the two lowest payoffs 
(1!2) form tiles of four 
games, defining the games 
that are closest to each other. 
Swaps in middle payoffs 
(2!3) and further low and 
mid swaps create a layer of nine tiles, and thirty-six 
games, which is a torus. Swaps in high payoffs (3!4) 
create games on other layers, leading to the full topol-
ogy of strict (no ties) ordinal games (Plate 1).  
   Layers and payoff families. Symmetric games lie on a 
diagonal from lower left (southwest) to upper right 
(northeast) (Plate 2a). In each layer, the lowest three 
rows have dominant strategies for the row player, and 
the left three columns have dominant strategies for the 
column player (Plate 2b). The regions with dominant 
strategies have a single Nash Equilibrium, while those 
without dominant strategies have either no Nash 
Equilibria, for the Cyclic games; or two, for the Stag 
Hunt and Battle of the Sexes families of games.  
   Payoff families based on Nash Equilibria provide a 
way of categorizing games by outcomes (Plate 1 and 
Plate 2c) and further revealing structure in the topol-
ogy. Alignment of the two highest payoffs distin-
guishes layers (as shown by the payoff patterns inset in 
Plate 2a). Layer One, with the highest payoffs diago-
nally opposite, contains the symmetric games most 
studied by researchers: Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken 
(often analyzed in evolutionary biology as Hawk and 
Dove strategies), and Battle of the Sexes, a variant of 
which is also called Hero (Rapoport 1967). Asymmet-
ric variants of Battle of the Sexes still have identical 
Nash Equilibria, while their improper cousins mix 4,3 
and 4,2 equilibria, combining Battle of the Sexes and 
Chicken outcomes. Layer One also contains the Pris-
oner's Delight game (Binmore 2007) and its variants, 
with second-best outcomes for each player at the Nash 
Equilibrium.  
   Layer Three has the two highest (win-win) payoffs in 
the same cell, forming mostly harmonious games with 
a single equilibrium based on dominant strategies for 
one or both players. The four proper Stag Hunt games, 
have 4,4 and 3,3 equilibria, bordered by games that mix 
4,4 with 3,2 equilibria and, in one case a 2,2 equilib-
rium. Layer 3 games have been labeled as “no conflict” 
or “boring.” However, as Robinson and Goforth point 
out, even many of the games with a single win-win 
equilibrium are games of mixed interests (Plate 2f). 
“No conflict” is a misnomer. The Stag Hunt (assur-
ance/coordination) games with two different Nash 
Equilibria are particularly interesting for social theory 
(Sen 1967; Kollock 1998; Skyrms 2004).  
   Layers Two and Four are mirror images of each other 
that differ only by switching the positions of row and 
column players, part of the symmetric structure of the 
topology along the axis created by the symmetric 
games. Layers Two and Four include the well-known 
category of Cyclic games. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
largest subfamily, on these layers and overall, is com-
posed of Samaritan games where a player following a 
dominant strategy gets their second-ranked outcome 
(exemplified by Buchanan’s (1977; Schmidtchen 2002) 
model of Active Samaritan’s Dilemma, Game 262).  
   Next to the Samaritan games are Unfair games, where 
a dominant strategy would lead a player to their third-
ranked outcome. It should be noted these outcomes 
would result from playing dominant strategies based on 
a narrow, short-sighted rationality. Nash Equilibria 
need not match results from actual play, given bounded 
rationality, heuristics, learning, and other strategic fac-
tors, especially if communication is possible and play is 
repeated, (or if play begins from a particular starting 
point, as with the game of Samson and Delilah (Game 
213) in Bram’s (1994) Theory of Moves).      
   Layers Two and Four include asymmetric siblings 
and cousins to Prisoner's Dilemma with poor Pareto-
inefficient Nash Equilibria, forming the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma Family identified by Robinson and Goforth. 
This family can extend to include the adjoining Tragic 
games that also have poor 3,2 outcomes, but lack even 
the possibility of a Pareto-superior outcome. This layer 
also has additional games with 3,3 equilibria, part of a 
family of Second Best games.  
   The 12 symmetric games plus the 66 games above or 
below that axis of symmetry (for switching positions of 
row and column players) compose the 78 unique strict 
ordinal games identified by Rapoport and colleagues 
(Rapoport and Guyer 1966; Rapoport, Guyer, and 
Gordon 1976). The topology includes key distinctions 
from that earlier taxonomy (Plate 2h), including the 
presence of win-win (4,4 or “no conflict”) outcomes, 
two Nash Equilibria or none, and a Pareto-deficient 
equilibrium (though only identified by them for Pris-
oner’s Dilemma and not for its siblings and cousins). 
The topology allows overlapping categories, rather than 
the Linnaean hierarchy attempted by Rapoport and col-
leagues, and does not depend on somewhat debatable 
judgments about threats and responses. Another typol-
ogy and ordering of 2x2 games was developed by 
Brams (1994). Plotting this on the topology (Plate 2h) 
shows that his categories, and concepts concerning 
non-myopic equilibria, mainly cover games on Layers 
Two and Four (and he ignored Layer Three).  
   The topology locates the symmetric games within the 
much larger number of asymmetric games (Plate 2a), 
puts Prisoner's Dilemma and other games with Pareto-
inferior and poor outcomes into the context of the 
games with better, but often biased, outcomes at Nash  
Equilibria (Plate 2c), and shows how games of pure 
conflict and of pure cooperation are greatly outnum-
bered by games with mixed interests (Plate 2f). 
    Hotspots and pipes. Swaps in 
the two highest payoffs link 
layers, with all the games in each 
row or column slice of tiles 
moving to the same layer, for row 
or column swaps respectively 
(2d). In hotspots, high swaps for 
both row and column link two 
tiles on two layers. Pipes weave 
together four tiles on four layers. 
Links in pipes and hotspots can be followed more eas-
ily by separating movement into three components, for 
layer, tile, and game, corresponding to changes in the 
location of the four, three and two payoff values. 
Swapping a four changes layer, swapping a three 
changes tile, and swapping a one or two moves within a 
tile. (These components can also map swaps between 
non-adjoining payoffs, as in Buchanan’s two versions 
of Samaritan’s Dilemma.) For institutional analysis and 
design, swaps map how changes in payoff ranking 
transform incentive structures, for example the two 
swaps, one for each player, that transform Prisoner’s 
Dilemma into a Stag Hunt (Figure 2) or the single 
swaps that change Samaritan’s Dilemma into a win-win 
game (Bruns 2010c).  
   Ties. Half-swaps make (or 
break) a tie between two 
adjoining payoffs, thus creat-
ing games in between those 
in a tile (Robinson, Goforth, 
and Cargill 2007) (see Plates 
2g and 3), One example is 
the game midway between 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
Chicken (Figure 3 and Plate 
3a) (Oskamp 1971; Kilgour 
and Fraser 1988; Rapoport, Guyer, and Gordon 1976, 
31). Combined swaps for both row and column create a 
game at the center of each tile, usually a simplified or 
idealized version of the games in the tile. Taken to-
gether, the games with ties for the two lowest payoffs 
form a simplified matrix of Tile Games (Plate 3c). 
Rousseau's story where all must cooperate to hunt a 
stag, but a player can get a hare regardless of what oth-
ers do, corresponds (in the two-player version) to a 
game with ties for the middle payoffs, located diago-
nally between two tiles (Plate 3b). All ordinal games 
with ties can be seen as located between the games in 
the strict topology.  
   Additional ties form simpler games, down to Utter 
Harmony, the simplest game where both have at least 
one preference (Plate 3d). Robinson et al. noted that the 
games with two pairs of tied preferences form arche-
typal games, including Zero Sum (or, more precisely, a 
fixed sum game). Despite some claims that people are 
unlikely to play mixed strategies in real life, simple 
games on the same matrix as Utter Harmony pose situa-
tions where mixed or synchronized strategies would be 
very advantageous in repeated play.  
   Natural order. Robinson, Goforth and Cargill  (2007) 
arranged their table of the number of unique non-strict 
ordinal games by the preference classes identified by 
Fraser and Kilgour (1986) resequenced to progress 
from the games with ties on the lowest payoffs to those 
with ties on higher payoffs (Robinson, Goforth, and 
Cargill 2007)(Plate 4b). Players may have two, three, or 
four distinct preferences (Plate 4a). For two prefer-
ences, there are three patterns: ties for the low rank, a 
pair of ties, or top rank. For three preferences, there 
may be ties for the low, middle, or high values. Con-
trary to Fraser and Kilgour's assertion (1986, 103) that 
"there is no natural order" for the non-strict games, the 
topology with ties, as resequenced by Robinson et al. 
shows a natural progression in numbers of preferences, 
leading from Utter Harmony (or the even simpler null 
game where neither player has a preference) at the 
southwest corner to Prisoner's Dilemma in the northeast 
corner (Plate 4a) (Bruns 2010b).  
   This natural ordering also implies that if one wants to 
follow the conventional arrangement (used by Robin-
son and Goforth within games) of putting higher values 
along the north and east axes, then their table should be 
flipped, to move Prisoner's 
Dilemma from the southwest 
to the northeast. However, 
for convenient display of 
game properties, including 
swaps in high payoffs for 
Prisoner's Dilemma and 
neighboring games, it is still 
convenient to scroll the (to-
rus) display to put Prisoner’s 
Dilemma near the center, as in Plate 1.   
   Normalizing real games. As discussed by Robinson 
and Goforth, each ordinal game represents an equiva-
lence class of games with real number payoffs, al-
though their simulation studies pointed out that games 
with the same ordinal structure behave differently and 
chaotically, if minor errors are allowed. The games 
with four discrete values from one to four may be seen 
as discrete equivalents to games with payoffs measured 
on interval or cardinal scales. Normalized versions of 
those games could be displayed on order graphs. The 
topology of ordinal games thus provides a set of coor-
dinates for mapping the locations of games, and navi-
gating between games through swaps or half-swaps in 
discrete ordinal payoffs, and through smaller changes 
in real values.  
   Coordinates. Robinson and Goforth’s numeric index-
ing could be used for the matrices of games with ties 
(Plate 4a). In conjunction with Fraser and Kilgour’s 
preference classes for ties (A-H), this would identify 
the location of specific games. Alternatively, “geo-
graphic” references (north-south-east-west) could be 
used, along with an index of preference classes. For a 
display arranged in the “natural order” with Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in the far northeast corner (Plate 5), then 
Rousseau’s Stag Hunt, with ties on the two middle 
preferences and a win-win outcome, would be game 
GG311, at the intersection of the 22 preference class, in 
the southwest layer, on the northeast corner: (Game 
2222swNW, as in Plate 4a).  
   Robinson and Goforth’s convention for displaying 
games puts the column with Row’s four to the right 
(east) and the row with Column’s four up (north), so 
win-win (4,4) payoffs are in the upper-right (northeast) 
cell. Games with row’s four to the west or column’s 
four to the south could be shown as quadrants of a 
larger display, thereby including games equivalent by 
switching rows, columns, or both. Coordinates with the 
quadrant in this larger display would further specify 
games (implicitly, NE in Robinson and Goforth’s con-
vention). Research on heuristics and biases (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1990) found that responses to gains or 
losses are not symmetric, and similar differences may 
apply to otherwise equivalent games. It is worth noting 
that to the extent game payoffs occur randomly, and are 
not constrained to a small range of integer values, they 
will approximate the proportions in the topology of 144 
strict ordinal 2x2 games (Simpson 2010).  
   Universal resource identifiers (URIs) for games could 
help identify research on equivalent or similar games 
and facilitate comparative analysis, for example find-
ings from agent-based modeling, experiments, and 
other sources. For the semantic web (Berners-Lee et al. 
2001), the best identifiers for games would be payoffs 
themselves, suitably encoded (a format such as game 
(a,d;b,e/c,f;d,g). The topology gives coordinates for 
locating games and metrics for how closely they are 
related. The topology thus provides the basis for an on-
tology of games, (in the computer science or informa-
tion science sense of the term); more generally, the 
topology graphs a connected ontology in payoff space 
(ecologically) and joint preferences (cognitively).  
   Extensions. As with game theory generally, the to-
pology can extend to multiple players or moves, and 
preferences measured on ratio or real scales (Plate 4d). 
In the payoff space, the topology can extend to payoffs 
that are fuzzy, probabilistic, uncertain, or dynamic.  
   Conclusions. The 2x2 games are only a small elemen-
tary enclave within a vast and complex multidimen-
sional space of joint preferences and actions. 
Nevertheless, such games can aid understanding of in-
stitutional diversity (Ostrom 2005, 6), not only of 
strategies but also of incentive structures and how they 
might be transformed. Visualization of payoff families, 
ordering games with ties by preference classes, and 
normalization of real payoffs further illustrate how the 
topology arranges the connections between 2x2 games. 
Overall, the topology links 2x2 games in an elegant 
order, showing relationships among games and their 
properties, guiding navigation between games, and aid-
ing analysis of potential transmutations between games 
as part of institutional analysis and design.  
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No Conflict C. Alignednw C. Alignedne C Assurancenw C Assurancese Win-win Id. Hegemony' Blackmailer' Hostage' Delilah' Samson' Heg. Stability' —
3 4 2 4 1 4 1 4 2 4 3 4 4 3 4 2 4 1 4 1 4 2 4 3
—   1 2 |   1 3 2 3 X   3 2 3 1 —   2 1 —   2 1  |   3 1 3 2 X    2 3 1 3 —   1 2
To find a game: Make ordinal 1<2<3<4
Put column with Row's 4 right; put row with
Column's 4 up. Then find layer, Modified from Robinson and Goforth 2005
Row's 4 up=Layers 2&3; down=1&4 The Topology of 2x2 Games: A New Periodic Table
Column's 4 left=Layers 1&2. Right=3&4 also see: www.cs.laurentian.ca/dgoforth/home.html
Find Row & Column payoffs © CC BY-SA  2010 v2.3
Game is at intersection. Available at www.bryanbruns.com/2x2chart.pdf
23
4
 2. The Topology Arranges 2x2 Games in an Elegant Order
a. Twelve Symmetric Games on Diagonal b. Dominant Strategies and Nash Equilibria c. Payoff Familes and Subfamilies
4 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 6 5 4 3 2 4 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 6 5 4 3 2 1
2 Chicken Ch 23 14 Column Column Battles 2
3 Battle of the Sexes BoS 32 14 1 0 1 2 Self- of the 3
4 Hero (BoSsw) Hr
31 24 serving Sexes 4
5 4 Delight-Pure Dp 4
21 34  R & C  Row  R & C  Row 5
6
4
Delight-Mixed Dm
4 12 34 1 1 1 1 6
1 PRISONER'S Pd DILEMMA 13 24 Alibi  Pd FAMILY 1
2 S Stag Hunt 14 23 Column Column Tragic 2
3 Ane Assurancene
14
32 1 2 1 0 Stag Hunts 2ND CYCLIC 3
4
4 
4 Asw Assurancesw
24 31 BEST 4
5 Hm Harmony-Mixed 34 21  R & C  Row  R & C  Row Harmonious BIASED 5
6 Hp Harmony-Pure 4
4 34
12 1 1 1 1 WIN-WIN Samaritan 6
1 Nc No Conflict 24 13 UNFAIR 1
3 34 24 14 14 24 34 43 42 41 41 42 43 2 Row has dominant strategies in lower 3 rows, 3 Tragic subfamily added to Pd family 2
12 13 23 32 31 21 21 31 32 23 13 12 column in left 3 columns, of each layer Added families: Second Best, Biased, and Unfair 
Row payoffs same across row, column same down Areas with 0, 1, or 2 Nash Equilbria; Subfamilies:Samaritan, Self-serving, & Harmonious
d. High swaps (3!4) link layers e. Order Diagrams Show Symmetries f. Interests Aligned or Mixed
6 hotspots double-link tiles # # N NE — 2 ! ! " # # $ $ % & & 2
  on two layers by 3!4 swaps W # # E X 3 # ' ' $ & ( ( ! 3
6 pipes link 4 tiles on 4 layers SW S # # | 4 # ' ' $ & ( ( ! 4
3!4 swap layer vectors — X | !" 5 & & $ $ ' # # ! ! " 5
Inside tile: " row swaps row. ! column swaps column 6 " " ! # ' ' $ # 6
4 Scrolled to natural layout: Pd neNEne 1 1 " " ! # ' ' $ # 1
34 N NE — 12 N NE Pd 1 2 ! ! ( & & $ $ ' # # 2
Sd Ab Hg — Tc Ss 2 3 & ( ( ! # ' ' $ 3
W 24 E X W 13 E 3 4 & ( ( ! # ' ' $ 4
Sa Cy Sn X Pr Bx Ss' 4 5 & & ! ! ( & & $ $ % 5
SW S 14 | SW S 14 5 6 ( ( ! & % % $ & 6
Bn 2nd Bu | Dl Pr' Tc' 6 1 ( ( ! & % % $ & 1
— — X X | | — — X X | | 3 Column R 2 4 1
34 N NE — 12 N NE 1 Left Right C + % & ( ( Pure cooperation
Al Ac Ww — Bu Sn Hg 2 Up 4 3
4
Lines show inducement vectors ± $ ! ' Pure conflict
W 13 E X E 24 E 3Row 1 3
3
For Row, after Column chooses  - ' # " % " Type Games
Cm Co Ar X 2nd Cy Ab 4 2 1
2
For Column, after Row chooses  - ±  + Mixed motives
SW S 23 | SW S 23 5Down 2 4
1
Symmetric For inducement correspondences, see:
Ha Cm' Al' | Bn Sa Sd 6
1 2 3 4
Quasi-symmetric Greenberg 1990 The Theory of Social Situations
3 6 5 4 3 2 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 Sub-symmetric For Type games, see Robinson & Goforth 2005
g. Games with Ties are within the Topology h. Rapoport, Guyer & Gordon Taxonomy i. Brams Typology and Game Numbers
4 6 5 4 3 2 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 4 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 4 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 6 5 4 3 2 1
1 2 55 50 49 70 78 72 39 35 36 65 67 66 2 50 37 36 46 31 29 22 18 19 52 53 57
2 3 56 52 51 74 76 71 37 31 32 64 68 67 3 56 39 38 43 45 47 20 14 15 51 54 53
3 4 44 41 40 73 75 77 38 33 34 69 64 65 4 49 13 12 42 44 30 21 16 17 55 51 52
4 5 18 16 15 53 42 45 10 8 7 34 32 36 5 6 4 3 40 23 25 10 8 7 17 15 19
5 6 17 14 13 54 43 46 11 9 8 33 31 35 6 5 2 1 41 24 26 11 9 8 16 14 18
6 1 21 19 20 57 47 48 12 11 10 38 37 39 1 35 33 34 48 27 28 32 11 10 21 20 22
2 26 22 23 58 62 61 48 46 45 77 71 72 2 28 26 25 30 47 29
1 3 27 24 25 59 63 62 47 43 42 75 76 78 3 No numbers for 27 24 23 44 45 31
2 4 30 28 29 60 59 58 57 54 53 73 74 70 4 "no conflict" games 48 41 40 42 43 46
3 5 2 4 5 29 25 23 20 13 15 40 51 49 5 34 1 3 12 38 36
4 6 1 3 4 28 24 22 19 14 16 41 52 50 6 33 2 4 13 39 37
5 1 6 1 2 30 27 26 2 17 18 44 56 55 1 35 5 6 49 56 50
6 No conflict Strongly stable Non-myopic equilibria Not cyclic
3 Swaps1!2&2!3 Half-swaps 1=2&2=3 PdneNEne2 No equilibria Stable  NMEs  3 2 1 Weakly cyclic
Ordinal games are at intersections (nodes/vertices) 2 equilibria, non-eq. solution Force-vulnerable See Brams 1994 Moderately cyclic
Games with ties (non-strict) lie between strict 2 equilibria, eq. solution Threat-vulnerable Theory of Moves  Strongly cyclic
ordinal games (as do other normalized games) Strongly stable deficient Unstable
See Plate 3b and see Robinson, Goforth & Cargill 2007 Adapted from Robinson & Goforth 2003; see Rapoport et al. 1976 The 2x2 Games ©
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 3. Ties Make Simpler Games Within the Topology of 2x2 Games
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C Assurancesw C Assurancese Stag Hunt
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Prisoners D. Assurancenw Assurancene R Assurran.'nw C Aligned C Assurance Win-win Hamlet Samson'  Hegemon's D'
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Chicken's D Assurance C Commons Coordination R Assurance 2nd Best' Cycle' Row's Alibi
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C Turns C's Win-win Column's Risk Golden Rule Column's Win
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C's Lead Match PennY Row's Risk Zero Sum 1=2 Half-swap payoff tie or split
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1 see Robinson, Goforth & Cargill 2007:9
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Harmony RulesRow's Lead Row's Win-win by swaps of rows, columns or both
Row's Games Ruler Games Column Triples
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Utter HarmonyColumn Mix No dominance
Sync Games Column's Games Column's Dislikes
21 0001 22 0011  23 0111
a. Ties Make Games 
in Between 
Chicken's Dilemma at 
the center of the  
Pd-Chicken Tile 
b. A Herd of Stag Hunts 
Rouseau's Stag and Hare Hunt 
diagonally between tiles. 2=3 half-swaps  
c. Tile Games  
Made by two 1=2 half-swaps 
d. Simple Games  
Two preferences for both players, 
one, two, or three ties 
 4. Navigation Chart for the Topology of  2x2 Ordinal Games with Ties
o 1 1 5 3 1 6 2 1 5 3 1 5 3 1 5 3 1 5 3 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 6 5 4 3 2 1
4 H 1
1,2,3,4 2
3
a. Preference 4
    Combinations 5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
HH: Strict 2x2 Ordinal Games
33G 1
1,2,3=4 2
3
4
5
6
High Ties
32F 1
1,2=3,4 3
5
R 1
3
5
Mid Ties (w/ Rousseau's SH)
31D 1
1=2,3,4 3
5
1
3
5
Low Ties: Tile Games
23 1
E 0111 2
1,2=3=4 R Dislikes R Triples Maximin
22 6
C 0011 1
1,2=3,4 3
5
R Games Archetypes C Triples
21 1
B 0001 1
1=2=3,4 Sync C. Games C Dislikes
1 0
A 0000 Null
1=2=3=4 H 1,2,3,4
1,2,3,4
1 21 22 23 31 32 33 4
A 0000 B 0001 C 0011 E 0111 D 1134 F 1224 G 1244
1=2=3=4 1=2=3,4 1,2=3,4 1,2=3=4 1=2,3,4 1,2=3,=4224 1,2,3=4
4 H
33 G
32 F
31 D
23 E
22 C
21 B
1 A
Total A B C E D F G H
1 21 22 23 31 32 33 4
Adapted from Robinson, Goforth & Cargill 2007:9, 13; see Fraser and Kilgour 1988 © CC BY-SA  www.bryanbruns.co/2x2chart.pdf 2010 v0.2.2ß
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36 24 72 72 72
36 36 36 72
36
3 6
72
12
1413
3
18 36
1 4 6 4 12 12 12 24
3 6 12 6
6
1 1 3 1
1 4 6 4
12 18 12
12 18 12
24
3
3
3
18 18
12 12
12 18 12 36 36
24
36 36 36
72
1=2 
2=3 
3=4 
4
1 
31 33 32 
23 21 22 
b. Ordinal Games Categorized 
by Distinct Payoff Classes 
n-person 
n-move 
real payoffs 
time 
payoff 
functions 
uncertainty 
c. Half-swap Pathways between 
All ties and no ties 
d. Beyond 
Extending the Topology 
